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I. INTRODUCTION
As of this writing, 252 people have been exonerated by means of DNA
evidence, 1 most leaving prison cells after many years in prison. These
exonerations represent only the ―tip of an iceberg‖2—the actual numbers of
wrongly convicted people are undoubtedly much higher.3 The leading cause
of wrongful convictions has been shown to be erroneous eyewitness
identifications. 4 Many studies of exonerations find that erroneous eyewitness
identifications play a part in over 75% of all wrongful convictions. 5 These
studies have led to numerous proposals for the reform of police procedures, 6
yet we see surprisingly little progress toward minimizing eyewitness
identification error, a major cause of failure in our criminal justice systems.
In 1999, the Department of Justice‘s (DOJ) National Institute of Justice
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1. See Innocence Project, http://innocenceproject.org (last visited Apr. 18, 2010) (citing 252
exonerations by means of DNA evidence as of April 18, 2010). This does not include the hundreds
of others exonerated by other means. See Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States
1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 523–24 (2005) (reporting one study that
examined 340 exonerations from 1989 to 2003, a little less than half of which were cleared by DNA
evidence and the rest by other means).
2. Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 62 (2008); see also Sandra
Guerra Thompson, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt? Reconsidering Uncorroborated Eyewitness
Identification Testimony, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1487, 1491 (2008) (arguing that ―untold numbers of
additional innocent people have been punished for crimes they did not commit‖).
3. See generally Samuel R. Gross, Convicting the Innocent, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 173,
174–76 (2008) (addressing the rate of false convictions and some types of wrongful conviction
cases).
4. Thompson, supra note 2, at 1490 (citing studies of eyewitness testimony and wrongful
convictions).
5. Id. at 1490–91; see also Innocence Project, Understand the Causes: Eyewitness
Misidentification,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Eyewitness-Misidentification.php
(last visited Apr. 18, 2010).
6. In an earlier essay, I compared the recommendations of the leading organizations that have
conducted studies of eyewitness identifications. See Sandra Guerra Thompson, What Price Justice?
The Importance of Costs to Eyewitness Identification Reform, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 33, 33 (2008).
See also infra note 39 and accompanying text (listing reports that include proposed procedures for
eyewitness identification).
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published its influential study of eyewitness identification procedures that
included detailed recommended guidelines. 7 Following that effort, several
other government and private task forces have followed suit and conducted
additional independent studies, yielding similar proposals for reform. 8 Over
the past decade, it is fair to say that a growing consensus on state-of-the-art
procedures for obtaining eyewitness identifications has emerged among
reformers.9 Such procedures include techniques for reducing suggestion; for
instance, having live lineups and photo arrays conducted by investigators who
do not know the identity of the suspect, thus eliminating the possibility that
the investigator might unconsciously influence the witness‘s selection or give
the witness confirmatory feedback (e.g., ―Good, you picked the right guy.‖)
that has been found to bolster a witness‘s confidence in the selection. 10 Other
recommendations pertain to how suspects are viewed, how witnesses are
instructed, and how identification procedures are documented.11
Reform groups have urged law enforcement to implement the
recommended procedures voluntarily. 12
Ten years after the Justice
Department issued its report only a handful of states have adopted any
reforms, whether as a matter of state constitutional law, evidentiary rules, or
by statute.13 A handful of police departments have voluntarily implemented
some of the critical reforms. 14 Overall, the vast majority of the thousands of
independent law enforcement agencies across the country have made few, if
any, changes to the status quo.15
7. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
8. Id.
9. See Thompson, supra note 6, at 42–54.
10. See Thompson, supra note 2, at 1504–06; see also infra Part II.B.
11. See infra Part II.B.
12. Id.
13. Only a few states have adopted more protective state constitutional or evidentiary rules.
See, e.g., State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 487, 492 (Utah 1986) (finding that trial courts should give a
cautionary instruction regarding eyewitness identification in cases involving no corroborating
evidence); State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582, 591, 593–95 (Wis. 2005) (relying on ―extensive studies
on the issue of identification‖ and citing Department of Justice (DOJ) guidelines, as well as social
science findings, in rejecting federal due process reliability assessment for show-ups and making
show-ups necessary to comply with state due process requirements). See also infra note 39 and
accompanying text (citing reforms in North Carolina, New Jersey, and recommended procedures
established in Wisconsin).
14. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
15. I have previously argued that police departments are unlikely to adopt the suggested reform
procedures on their own initiative. See Thompson, supra note 2, at 1519–20. At present, police
departments apparently have not felt sufficient political pressure, or seen any other reason, to
implement the changes of their own accord. Indeed, in some cases, the suggested reforms have been
met with intense resistance by law enforcement. See SHERI H. MECKLENBURG, REPORT TO THE
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS: THE ILLINOIS PILOT PROGRAM ON SEQUENTIAL DOUBLEBLIND IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES, at iv (2006), available at http://www.chicagopolice.org/
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This Article presents the findings of an empirical study of recent case law
in which defendants challenge the legality of eyewitness identification
procedures. The study involved a review of all cases within the calendar year
beginning on April 8, 2008, and ending on April 8, 2009, in which state
appellate courts issued opinions and in which the suggestiveness of
eyewitness identification procedures were challenged. In the cases surveyed,
only a small percentage of the police investigations followed any of the
recommended procedures and usually the most critical procedures were not
followed. The overwhelming majority of police departments in the cases
surveyed followed the same suggestive procedures that have contributed to
misidentifications and wrongful convictions in the past.16
The study reported here examines only cases that met the following
conditions: (1) eyewitness identification was an important issue; (2)
defendants asserted their right to trial and challenged the identification at trial;
and (3) defendants continued to challenge the identification evidence on
appeal. In a sense the cases examined here represent the most worrisome
cases, those in which defendants have called upon the courts to correct
perceived errors in the process. However, this survey does not tell us much
about the remaining universe of cases in which eyewitness identification plays
a role. It tells us nothing, for example, about the procedures actually followed
in police departments throughout the country. 17 Thus, we cannot draw any
sweeping conclusions about overall police practices from this survey‘s small
sample. To obtain such information, one would have to conduct a massive
survey of the tens of thousands of independent police agencies throughout the
country. What this survey does provide, however, is a glimpse at a relatively
small number of cases in which defense lawyers have asserted mistaken
eyewitness identification both at trial and on appeal. Even this limited view is
not encouraging.
As this Article will demonstrate, many of the same problems and practices
that have contributed to erroneous identifications in the past continue to
present themselves in recently decided cases. The reported appellate
decisions often do not indicate whether other corroborating evidence of
identification is present. However, some courts make clear that an
eyewitness‘s identification testimony was the sole basis for the conviction. 18
ILPilotonEyewitnessID.pdf; see also Thompson, supra note 6, at 47 (discussing the Illinois
legislature‘s resistance to sequential lineups).
16. See infra notes 89–97 and accompanying text.
17. We can look to sources such as the Innocence Project which compile data on the states that
have implemented reforms, but even that information tells us little about the procedures actually
followed by police departments in most states. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Shabazz v. State, 667 S.E.2d 414, 416 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008). I have previously
called for a requirement that eyewitness identification testimony be corroborated in all cases to
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Given the lessons drawn from countless social science studies about the
particular factors that reduce eyewitness accuracy and the police practices that
inject suggestiveness, it is a safe bet that at least some of the defendants from
the dozens of cases reviewed were wrongly convicted.
How do appellate courts respond to the challenges to eyewitness
identification evidence in these cases? In this study, none of the courts invoke
state constitutional law or evidentiary rules to reject the suggestive practices
decried by reformers.19 The courts do not exclude eyewitness testimony, even
when it is obtained under circumstances that have been shown scientifically to
be error-prone, nor do they find such testimony insufficient to support a
verdict without additional corroborating evidence. 20 Indeed, many of the
appellate opinions continue to view the eyewitness‘s degree of certainty as an
indicator of reliability, despite the fact that social science research proves
otherwise. 21
Meanwhile, the courts often overlook other indicia of
unreliability. Just as in the days before the reforms were proposed, the study
shows that dubious eyewitness identification evidence continues to be
admitted, and appellate courts continue to turn a blind eye to defense
challenges based on suggestiveness and unreliability of such evidence. If one
reads only the recent case law challenging suggestive identification procedures,
one might get the impression that the innocence reform movement—and the
exoneration of hundreds of innocent persons—never happened.22
Part II of this Article provides a brief review of social science findings on
eyewitness identifications, especially as they pertain to violent crimes
perpetrated against strangers, and the reform procedures proposed by
influential groups as a means of improving the accuracy of eyewitness
identifications. These proposed reforms take into account social science
research regarding both the weaknesses of eyewitness identification evidence
and the effects of various police practices. Part III presents the findings of an
empirical study of state appellate case law and provides data regarding the
prevent erroneous convictions. See Thompson, supra note 2, at 1523–43. Because no state has yet to
implement such a corroborating evidence requirement, there are no such challenges to the lack of
corroborating evidence. I reiterate here that a rule that would have the effect of requiring
investigators to gather evidence beyond eyewitness identification testimony would go a long way to
decrease erroneous convictions based on misidentification. Id. at 1523–28, 1540–43 (discussing
trade-offs and feasibility of a corroboration rule).
19. See infra notes 109–12 and accompanying text.
20. Id.
21. See infra notes 134–35 and accompanying text.
22. A study of cases involving exonerations showed that constitutional challenges to
eyewitness identifications had been rejected in 100% of the cases, again indicating that such
challenges have proved utterly useless in ferreting out erroneous identifications. See Garrett, supra
note 2, at 77. Apparently, even a heightened awareness of wrongful convictions and the perils of
eyewitness identifications have not caused most appellate courts to review identification claims more
generously. But see supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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types of crimes in which mistaken identification (and, thus, innocence) is the
main defense. The study examines the extent to which various factors are at
play in these cases, such as the use of weapons, lighting conditions, the use of
hats and disguises, and cross-racial identification. It also provides data on the
types of identification procedures used and the extent to which suggestive
procedures are followed. Part IV surveys the state appellate decisions in the
study and demonstrates that state appellate courts typically ignore the wellestablished scientific literature and the calls for procedural improvements.
II. THE FACTORS THAT PRODUCE UNRELIABLE EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION
TESTIMONY AND THE REFORM PROPOSALS DESIGNED TO
REMEDY THE PROBLEM
After many decades of research, social scientists have amassed a wealth of
literature proving definitively that certain variables reduce an eyewitness‘s
ability to make an accurate identification of a stranger. 23 Unfortunately, many
of these variables, known as ―estimator variables,‖ are inherent in the
fallibility of human beings as eyewitnesses and cannot be corrected by police
procedure. 24 For example, there is nothing the police can do to change the
fact that robbery victims often view their culprits in the dark, for only a brief
period of time, and while the robber is aiming a gun or knife at the victim,
which induces great stress in victims and causes them to focus on the weapon.
Each of these estimator variables has been shown to decrease the accuracy of
an identification. 25 Also, the police cannot correct the increased risk of
misidentification created by the fact that a culprit and a victim are not of the
same race or by the fact that robbers often wear hats, disguises, or have facial
hair.26 Likewise, when witnesses are either very young or very old or have

23. For a general overview of the scientific literature pertinent to variables that reduce the
accuracy of eyewitness identifications in violent crimes, see Thompson, supra note 2, at 1497–1506.
24. See Gary L. Wells & Eric P. Seelau, Eyewitness Identification: Psychological Research and
Legal Policy on Lineups, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. P OL‘Y & L. 765, 766 (1995). See also Thompson, supra
note 2, at 1501–04 (addressing estimator variables).
25. The effects of poor lighting and limited time for viewing on the ability to identify a stranger
are obvious. See Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, Eyewitness Testimony, 54 ANN. REV.
PSYCHOL. 277, 280–82 (2003) (noting that the accuracy of an eyewitness‘s identification can be
affected by many factors, including lighting conditions, amount of time the subject is viewed,
whether the subject wears a disguise, lessened ability to recognize a person of a different race, and
presence of a weapon, among others); ELIZABETH LOFTUS, JAMES M. DOYLE & JENNIFER E.
DYSART, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY : CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 16–36 (4th ed. 2007) (addressing lighting,
violence, stress and fear, and weapon focus). Scientific studies confirm the effects of ―weapon
focus‖ and stress, both of which have been shown to reduce the accuracy of eyewitness
identifications. See Bruce W. Behrman & Sherrie L. Davey, Eyewitness Identification in Actual
Criminal Cases: An Archival Analysis, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 475, 476 (2001); ELIZABETH F.
LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 35–36 (1996).
26. See Thompson supra note 2, at 1501 (on cross-racial identification); see also Wells &
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used alcohol or controlled substances, studies have shown an increased risk of
erroneous identification.27 It bears repeating that no police procedure can
improve the inherent failings of a witness‘s ability to recall the face of a
stranger observed under difficult circumstances.
On the other hand, the police can greatly exacerbate the problem of
inherently weak identifications by suggesting to the witness that a selection
should be made or that the witness should choose a particular person. Factors
that contribute to an increased risk of error are known as ―system variables,‖ 28
which refer to the variables that can be controlled by the system. The
following sections address the system variables that can contribute to
identification error and the reform protocols designed to reduce those risks.
A. The Social Science of Eyewitness Identification—The System Variables
With so many estimator variables present in violent crimes, it stands to
reason that identification evidence in these kinds of cases will be particularly
unreliable. Thus, it is critical that the police follow procedures shown to
produce the most accurate identifications possible.
Experts consider as highly suggestive the single-suspect live viewings
conducted near the time of the crime (so-called ―show-ups‖) because
witnesses are likely to believe that the police have arrested the correct
person. 29 An eyewitness may wrongly assume that the police ―know‖ the
displayed person is guilty, when, in fact, the police may not have any idea
whether the person is the culprit. If the suspect is shown in the back of a
police car or wearing handcuffs, the situation further suggests to the witness
that the police have caught the ―right guy.‖
On the other hand, show-ups have some advantages. The scientific
literature confirms that delay in conducting an identification procedure will
reduce reliability of the identification. 30 Show-ups also allow the police to
quickly clear individuals who may in fact be innocent. Therefore, most courts
adopt the position that, on balance, the benefits of a show-up outweigh the
concerns about suggestiveness. 31 However, researchers have found that showups ―result in more false identifications than line-ups.‖32 In addition, show-

Olson, supra note 25, at 281.
27. LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 25, at 38 (studies show that children are ―relatively inaccurate‖
and also ―highly suggestible‖); Wells & Olson, supra note 25, at 280 (―very young children and the
elderly perform[] significantly worse than younger adults‖ in studies of eyewitness identification);
LOFTUS ET AL, supra note 25, at 46–50 (addressing effects of alcohol and other drugs).
28. See Wells & Seelau, supra note 24, at 766.
29. Behrman & Davey, supra note 25, at 477 (citing studies).
30. Id. at 476.
31. See infra notes 127–32 and accompanying text.
32. Behrman & Davey, supra note 25, at 477.
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ups, as well as single-photo identifications, create a secondary problem in that
they taint subsequent pre-trial or in-court identifications by producing a higher
level of confidence in the later identification. 33
Photo arrays or live lineups also can be conducted in a suggestive manner.
For example, when asked to identify a culprit from a photo array or live
lineup, eyewitnesses can be led to believe, or can erroneously assume, that the
culprit is definitely among the persons presented. In such cases, eyewitnesses
are prone to employ a psychological process known as ―relative judgment‖
that causes them to choose the person who most closely resembles the
culprit.34 Identifications under these circumstances tend to be reliable if the
true culprit is actually in the lineup or photo array, but such identifications are
highly inaccurate if the true culprit is not present. 35 Thus, simultaneous
presentation of individuals, together with statements indicating that the police
believe they have arrested the right person, are two types of system variables
that reduce the accuracy of eyewitness identifications. 36 If the identification
procedure is conducted by the investigating officer who knows the identity of
the suspect, there is also a concern that the officer may consciously or
unconsciously give an eyewitness clues about which person is the suspect. 37
Likewise, if the investigating officer gives an eyewitness confirmatory
feedback (e.g., ―Good, you‘ve picked the right guy.‖), this feedback tends to
inflate the witness‘s confidence in the accuracy of the identification and has
other distorting effects on a witness‘s memory. 38
B. The Reform Recommendations
In the wake of numerous high-profile exonerations in the 1990s, various
groups began to study scientific literature to determine what changes might be
made to police procedure that would promote reliability in eyewitness
identifications. In 1999, the DOJ published a highly influential report on
eyewitness identifications with proposed protocols and procedures
recommended for further study. Since then, several other respected groups
such as the American Bar Association (ABA), private organizations, and
several state agencies also have issued reports advocating improved
procedures.39 These recommendations are based on findings in social science
33. Id. at 488.
34. See Thompson supra note 2, at 1505–06.
35. Id. at 1506.
36. Id. at 1504–06.
37. Id. at 1504.
38. Id. at 1505 (citing studies).
39. See NAT ‘L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A GUIDE
FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT (1999), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/178240.pdf;
ACHIEVING JUSTICE: FREEING THE INNOCENT, CONVICTING THE GUILTY, REPORT OF THE ABA
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literature regarding witness memory as well as on considerations of effective
police practice.40
The proposals focus mostly on two eyewitness
identification procedures: live lineups and photo arrays. The reports give
much less attention to show-ups, which is unfortunate because show-ups
constitute one of the most commonly used identification procedures.41
The principle recommendations concern the procedures used to conduct
the identification, as well as the proper documentation of the identification
process. For lineups and photo arrays, most of the proposals recommend what
is known as ―blind,‖ or ―double-blind,‖ administration.42 In a blind
identification procedure, the investigator conducting the lineup or photo array
does not know the identity of the suspect.43 If the witness is also instructed
that the investigator is unaware of the suspect‘s identity, that is called
―double-blind.‖44 Using a double-blind procedure reduces suggestion in two
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION ‘S AD HOC INNOCENCE COMMITTEE TO ENSURE THE INTEGRITY OF THE
CRIMINAL PROCESS (Paul Giannelli & Myrna Raeder eds., 2006) [hereinafter ABA INNOCENCE
COMM. REPORT]; N.C. Actual Innocence Comm‘n, Recommendations for Eyewitness Identification,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/NC_Innocence_Commission_Identification.html; Letter from
Office of Att‘y Gen., State of N.J., to All County Prosecutors, Col. Carson J. Dunbar, Jr.,
Superintendent, NJSP, All Police Chiefs, All Law Enforcement Chief Executives, Attorney General
Guidelines for Preparing and Conducting Photo and Live Lineup Identification Procedures (Apr. 18,
2001),
available
at
http://www.psychology.iastate.edu/FACULTY/gwells/njguidelines.pdf
[hereinafter N.J. Att‘y Gen. Identification Guidelines]; THE JUSTICE PROJECT, EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATION : A P OLICY REVIEW (2007), available at http://www.thejusticeproject.org/
national/solution/improving-eyewitness-id/; Innocence Project, Fix the System: Eyewitness
Identification, http://www.innocenceproject.org/fix/Eyewitness-Identification.php (last visited
Apr. 18, 2010) [hereinafter Innocence Project, Fix Eyewitness Identification]; Innocence Project,
Mistaken
Eyewitness
Identifications,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/Mistaken_ID_
FactSheet.pdf. In the State of Wisconsin, the Attorney General adopted a ―Model Policy and
Procedure for Eyewitness Identification.‖ WIS. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, MODEL POLICY AND PROCEDURE
FOR
EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATION,
available
at
http://www.doj.state.wi.us/dles/tns/
EyewitnessPublic.pdf (recommending ―double-blind, sequential photo arrays and lineups, . . . nonbiased instructions to eyewitnesses, and assessments of confidence immediately after
identifications‖).
40. See Thompson, supra note 6, at 60–61 (addressing the extent to which reports take into
account practical considerations in recommending changes in police procedures).
41. Id. at 53–54.
42. The ABA, Innocence Project, North Carolina Actual Innocence Commission, the New
Jersey guidelines, and the Justice Project all have called for blind procedures. See Thompson, supra
note 6, at 41. Only the DOJ report is somewhat different; it tends to be more conservative in its
conclusions and does not actually recommend the implementation of blind procedures. See NAT‘ L
INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 39, at 9. Even so, it notes that ―blind procedures . . . are used in
science to prevent inadvertent contamination of research results, [but] may be impractical for some
jurisdictions to implement.‖ Id. It does recommend, however, that blind procedures should be an
area of ―future exploration and field testing.‖ Id.
43. See Amy Klobuchar, Nancy K. Mehrkens Steblay & Hilary Lindell Caligiuri, Improving
Eyewitness Identifications: Hennepin County’s Blind Sequential Lineup Pilot Project, 4 CARDOZO
PUB. L. P OL‘Y & ETHICS J. 381, 389–90 (2006).
44. Id. at 389.
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ways: (1) it ensures that the investigator conducting the identification
procedure cannot, either consciously or unconsciously, suggest which person
the witness should select; and (2) it deters witnesses, again consciously or
unconsciously, from looking to investigators for clues about whom to select.
It also eliminates the opportunity for the officer to give the witness
confirmatory feedback after the identification. 45
To combat the problem of relative judgment, whereby eyewitnesses tend
to select the person who most closely resembles the culprit, 46 researchers
recommend that photos or live individuals be displayed in sequential fashion,
rather than the traditional simultaneous fashion. 47 The benefit of sequential
presentation is that witnesses are less prone to select the wrong person. The
disadvantage, from the perspective of investigating officers, is that witnesses
are also less prone to make any selection at all. 48 As a result, the published
reports yield a less enthusiastic verdict on the adoption of sequential lineups
and photo arrays. Private organizations, such as the Innocence Project and the
Justice Project, have endorsed sequential presentation, while the ABA, DOJ,
and the State of Illinois have endorsed field testing. 49 Currently only two
states, New Jersey and North Carolina, along with a few localities, mandate
sequential presentation.50 Overall, the published reports agree that sequential
procedures should be adopted, at least for purposes of field testing.
Show-ups, one of the most common methods used to obtain eyewitness
identifications, have received scant attention, even from the reform proposals.
The DOJ report provides a number of important guidelines, such as separating
witnesses during a show-up. 51 The Innocence Project further recommends
that show-ups occur in a neutral location and manner, and that the suspect be
displayed without handcuffs (when practicable) and removed from the squad
car.52
For all identification methods, the proposals advocate proper
documentation and the use of non-suggestive questioning from the beginning
of an investigation through the identification process and thereafter.53 Also
important is the use of cautionary instructions prior to the display of a suspect
in a show-up, a photo array, or a lineup. 54 In show-ups, witnesses should be
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
See Thompson, supra note 2, at 1505–06.
Id. at 1519.
Id.
See Thompson, supra note 6, at 45–48.
Id. at 46–47.
Id. at 53.
Id.
Id. at 48–49, 52–53.
Id. at 52.
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told that the person displayed may not be the culprit. In photo arrays or
lineups, witnesses should be told that the suspect may or may not be present
and, ideally, that the investigation will continue even if the witness makes no
identification at that time. 55 Finally, all of the proposals would require
investigators to obtain and properly document a statement of the witness‘s
confidence in selecting a suspect immediately after the identification is
made. 56 The proposed changes to police protocol would go a long way in
reducing the negative effects that may occur through the police–witness
interaction.
Unfortunately, there appears to be little actual improvement in police
practices. Organizations like the Innocence Project keep track of jurisdictions
that adopt improved eyewitness identification procedures. It cites only two
states and eight localities that have mandated sequential, double-blind
procedures,57 which means that tens of thousands of police departments have
yet to change their practices. For example, in Texas, a state that has not
adopted new procedures on a statewide basis, a recent news report found that,
of the roughly two-dozen police departments in the Dallas area, only two even
had written policies for show-ups.58 This is especially alarming given that
Dallas has uncovered nineteen wrongful convictions in the past few years.59
Even in the face of intense media scrutiny over the large number of
exonerations in the Dallas area, the police departments in the region have not
responded by implementing any new procedures for show-ups, a commonly
used means of obtaining identifications. 60 The use of show-ups in Dallas is
55. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-284.52(b)(3) (2007) (requiring instructions to a witness
that the investigation will continue even if the witness does not make an identification).
56. Thompson, supra note 6, at 53. Asking for a witness‘s confidence level at the time an
identification is made reduces the common tendency for witnesses‘ confidence levels to rise as they
progress through the investigative and trial process. See John S. Shaw, III & Kimberley A. McClure,
Repeated Postevent Questioning Can Lead to Elevated Levels of Eyewitness Confidence, 20 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 629, 631, 647–48 (1996); see also infra notes 132–35, 142–44, and accompanying text
(on effects of confirmatory feedback on witness confidence and jury instructions on witness
confidence).
57. See
Innocence Project,
Eyewitness
Identification
Reform,
available
at
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/165.php (last visited Apr. 18, 2010). In addition, the State
of Maryland, by a statute passed in 2007, requires police agencies to develop written policies on
eyewitness identifications that must comply with DOJ standards. MD. CODE ANN. § 3-506 (2008).
The DOJ standards do not require blind and sequential lineups and photo arrays; however, the
standards recommend them for further study. NAT‘L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 39, at 8–9.
58. Steve McGonigle & Jennifer Emily, Falling Prey to “Drive-By” Identification, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Oct. 13, 2008, at 1A, available at http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/
dn/dnacases/stories/101308dnproDNAshowups.264c41d.html.
59. Id.
60. Id. (citing review of more than twenty years of appellate case law for the Dallas County
area, and finding more than 100 felony convictions following trials that were based on show-ups).
On the other hand, the Dallas Police Department has at long last implemented some improved
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just one example; but there is every reason to believe that the same practices
exist for police departments across the vast majority of the country. 61
III. AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF STATE APPELLATE DECISIONS IN
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION CASES
One hypothesis to be drawn from the research on eyewitness
identifications is that identifications made under the typical circumstances of a
violent crime are likely to be less reliable. Although many violent crimes are
perpetrated between individuals who know each other, 62 a substantial number
of violent crimes are perpetrated between strangers. 63 The typical scenario of
these crimes displays factors that are known to reduce eyewitness
identification reliability, such as use of a weapon, use of hats or disguises,
poor lighting due to nighttime, and little time to view the suspect. The
element of cross-race identification can be present as well. The findings of
the study presented here answer two questions: (1) what types of crimes and
circumstances are present among state appellate cases that raise eyewitness
identification as a principle issue; and (2) what procedures were followed by
the police in obtaining the identification evidence. Of critical importance is
whether the police procedures comport with the reform procedures as
specified by the DOJ and other groups.
In order to study appellate responses to identification evidence, I
conducted a survey of all state appellate decisions handed down during the
twelve-month period ending April 8, 2009, in which the introduction of
eyewitness identification testimony was challenged. 64 The research produced
128 cases, of which 31 were excluded, 65 leaving a total of 96 cases studied,
techniques for photo lineups. After a two-year delay, Dallas police began a study on blind,
sequential photo lineups, apparently using a computer to obtain the fillers for the lineups. See
Posting of Jennifer Emily, Dallas Police Study into Sequential Blind Photo Lineups Will Begin Soon,
Crime Blog (Oct. 16, 2008 07:01 EST), http://crimeblog.dallasnews.com/archives/2008/10/dallaspolice-study-into-seque.html.
61. See McGonigle & Emily, supra note 58.
62. See MICHAEL R. RAND, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, CRIME
VICTIMIZATION, 2008 (2009), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv08.pdf (addressing
relationships between offenders and victims by gender, age, and types of crimes).
63. For example, in 2008, 59% of victims of violent crime were related to or acquainted with
their assailants, but 41% of victims were either assaulted by strangers or had an unknown
relationship to their attackers. Id. at 5 tbl.6.
64. The survey was done via the Lexis search engine, searching all state court cases with the
date restrictors of April 8, 2008 and April 8, 2009. LexisNexis, http://www.lexisnexis.com (last
visited Apr. 18, 2010). The search terms were ―‗eyewitness identification‘ & suggestive.‖ These
terms were considered sufficiently broad to capture all cases involving constitutional challenges to
eyewitness identification testimony.
65. Cases were excluded for any of several reasons. First, cases were excluded if the
eyewitness and the suspect knew each other from a prior relationship, or if an eyewitness
identification was not actually challenged on appeal. When the witness has a prior relationship with
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representing twenty-two states.
The survey demonstrates a couple of important points about the types of
crimes in which eyewitness identifications play a critical role today. For
instance, DNA evidence has essentially eliminated sexual assault cases from
the mix of cases in which eyewitness identification testimony is critical. Of
the ninety-six cases under review, only four cases (about 4%) involved a
sexual assault. A recent study has shown that 100% of the cases in which
individuals had been exonerated by means of DNA evidence involved sexual
assault.66 Sexual assault cases in bygone days often relied solely on
identification testimony to establish the identity of the perpetrator, and history
has shown us that those eyewitnesses sometimes got it wrong. Because DNA
evidence is generally available in sexual assault cases, the police nowadays
routinely use DNA evidence to exclude wrongly identified suspects and
prevent miscarriages of justice in almost all of those cases.
On the other hand, because DNA evidence is usually unavailable for most
other crimes, the identification of culprits must still be made the old-fashioned
way—through inherently unreliable eyewitness identification testimony. Of
the ninety-six cases in the survey, 51% involved facts that constitute
robbery.67 Another 32.3% involved murder, attempted murder, or assault. Of

the suspect, the ―identification‖ is simply a formality, and there is no real doubt that the witness
would mistakenly identify an innocent person. Second, cases were excluded if the identifications
were made prior to 1999, the year when the DOJ issued its influential report on eyewitness
identification testimony. Because one aspect of the study examined the extent of compliance with
DOJ standards, the study could not include identifications made prior to 1999. See NAT‘L INST. OF
JUSTICE, supra note 39 (DOJ guideline on eyewitness evidence published in 1999). Cases in which
the identification was made without any police involvement were also excluded from the study. In a
few cases, the appeals presented no genuine issue relating to the eyewitness identification, so those
cases were excluded as well.
66. See Thompson, supra note 2, at 1491 n.12.
67. For purposes of the study, I have based the categorization of a case as involving ―robbery‖
or ―attempted robbery‖ if the facts involved a use of force or threat of force as a means of taking a
person‘s property against their will, or the attempt to do so. I did not base the category determination
on the conviction charges, which can sometimes obscure the real gist of the crime involved. For
example, a ―carjacking‖ involves a use of force as a means of stealing a car and possibly other
property. A prosecutor could charge this as a ―burglary‖ in some states in which unlawfully entering
a vehicle with intent to commit a felony can be considered burglary. The use of a weapon in such a
case could lead to an unlawful weapon possession charge. It better serves our purposes to recognize
that the facts fit the classic definition of robbery—a taking of property by means of force—better
than they correspond with our traditional understanding of burglary as an unlawful entry into a
habitation or as they fit a weapon possession charge, which tells us nothing about the violent nature
of the crime. It is important to call the set of facts ―robbery‖ because they belong to the category of
cases that I argue is most likely to involve erroneous eyewitness identification testimony t oday. The
robbery cases also include one conviction for conspiracy to commit robbery. In addition, in several
cases, individuals were charged both with robbery and an assaultive offense such as kidnapping
(n = 3), murder (n = 4), assault or attempted manslaughter (n = 4), or burglary (n = 3). All of these
cases are included only in the category designated ―Robbery/Attempted Robbery.‖
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the remaining cases, burglaries of homes made up 9.3%, thefts made up 2%,
and false imprisonment accounted for 1% of the total. In short, almost all the
cases (88.5%) involved murders, robberies, sexual assaults, or false
imprisonment—serious violent crimes.68 Interestingly, of the burglary/homeinvasion cases in the study, none involved the use of a weapon, 69 even though
burglaries are serious felonies with the potential for violence. If we add
burglaries to the calculus, then 97.9% of the cases in the study involved a
serious violent crime. All of the cases in the study included only stranger-onstranger crimes.70 In approximately 43% of the cases, lighting conditions
were not optimal because the crimes were committed during nighttime
hours.71 In addition, 65.7% of the cases involved the use of weapons (fifty
firearms, eleven knives, and two blunt objects (a pipe and a golf club)).72 In
11% of the cases, all of which were robberies, the culprits wore hats, had
bandanas covering their noses and mouths, or had facial hair that obscured the
features of their faces.

68. See infra Table 1.
69. One case in the study yielded convictions for both robbery and burglary. See State v.
Smith, Nos. 21463, 22334, Montgomery App. 2008-Ohio-6330 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2008). In this
case, the culprits forcibly entered a home specifically looking for one of the residents. Id. at ¶ 3.
Because the case can be viewed as one in which the culprits intended to confront the victims, it was
grouped with the robbery cases and excluded from the burglary cases. Id.
70. Again, I eliminated all cases in which the witnesses had a prior relationship or otherwise
knew the identity of the culprit. See supra note 65.
71. For purposes of this study, ―night‖ is defined as an offense committed between the hours of
9:00 p.m. and 5:00 a.m. or designated as having been committed at ―night,‖ ―after dark,‖ or ―during
nighttime.‖ Offenses committed indoors, regardless of time of day, were excluded, as were offenses
committed during ―evening.‖ In addition, in twenty-one cases neither the time of day nor the lighting
conditions were mentioned, so these were excluded for purposes of calculating the percentage of
cases occurring at night.
72. See infra Table 2.
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Table 1. Offenses Represented in Case Study
Offense
Robbery/Attempted Robbery
Murder/Attempted Murder/Assault
Burglary/Home-Invasion
Sexual Assault
Theft
False Imprisonment

Number Percentage
49
51.0
31
32.3
9
9.3
4
4.2
2
2.1
1
1.0

Table 2. Use of Weapons
Weapon
Firearm
Knife
Physical Assault, No Weapon
Blunt Object
Threat of Weapon, No Weapon
No Weapon
No Mention of Weapon

Number Percentage
50
52.1
11
11.5
6
6.2
2
2.1
2
2.1
23
24.0
2
2.1

From this data, we can determine that numerous estimator variables, which
decrease eyewitness identification accuracy, are at play in a substantial majority
of the cases studied. The well-documented effect of weapon-focus plays a role
in a majority (65.7%) of this group of cases. Poor lighting occurred in a
substantial percentage (43%) of the cases. The use of hats, bandanas across the
nose and mouth, facial hair, and other disguises applies in a smaller percentage
of the cases (11%), but these are all robberies, which also generally involve use
of weapons and other estimator variables. Finally, at least 88% of the cases
involve serious violent crimes, which will generally involve high levels of
stress, another known factor for decreasing the accuracy of identifications.73
Cross-racial identification is also an accuracy-decreasing factor.74 With
few exceptions,75 it was not possible to determine from the appellate decisions
whether the witnesses and culprits were of different races because the races of
the individuals often were not mentioned. 76
73. LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 25, at 29.
74. Cross-race identifications are less reliable than same-race identifications. See Thompson,
supra note 2, at 1501.
75. See, e.g., People v. Figueroa, No. B199625, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3529, at *5
(Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2008); Howell v. State, 989 So. 2d 372 (¶ 23) (Miss. 2008).
76. The issue is sometimes incidentally mentioned in challenges to lower courts‘ refusals to
admit expert testimony explaining that cross-race identifications are less reliable. See, e.g., People v.
Nazario, No. 3415/2006, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5350, at *1, 5–6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 30, 2008).
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Finally, witnesses often view criminal culprits when the witnesses are not
in a good physical condition to form an accurate memory of a culprit‘s face.
For example, in the cases studied, there was an eleven-year-old witness to a
murder,77 an elderly victim of a knife-point robbery,78 a witness who was
drinking beer at the time of the crime and on painkillers when he identified
the defendant,79 and another witness who may have been smoking
marijuana.80 One witness of a knife-point robbery viewed a robber who wore
a plastic nose and fake glasses,81 while the victim of another robbery had been
brutally beaten and left unconscious during the robbery. 82 One victim had
been shot multiple times,83 and another had a gun pressed to his head when he
saw the culprit for a few seconds. 84 One sexual assault victim saw her
attacker, while being sodomized, as the tape on her eyes came off and she
peered through a gap in the pillowcase the attacker had put over her head. 85
While any one of these estimator variables makes the identification less
likely to be accurate, this study demonstrates that, in violent crime cases such as
the vast majority of cases in this study, numerous estimator variables often are
present. To provide one of many possible examples, in Howell v. State, the
witness viewed a murder committed with a firearm, a highly stressful event to
observe.86 The witness saw the killing in low light of the early morning and
from about seventy-one feet away.87 It was a cross-race identification, and the
witness may have been smoking marijuana at the time. 88
The study sheds light on the mix of identification procedures used by
police departments in recently decided cases challenging identification

77. People v. Romero, 892 N.E.2d 1122, 1124–25 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). For a discussion of the
effects of age on the accuracy of eyewitness identification, see supra note 27 and accompanying text.
78. People v. Johnson, No. A118080, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5376, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App.
July 1, 2008) (victim was eighty-six years old); State v. Ayo, 2008-468, 2008-1179, p. 4 (La. App.
5 Cir. 3/24/09), 7 So. 3d 85, 90 (eighty-eight-year-old victim); see also supra note 27 and
accompanying text.
79. People v. Martinez, No. H03185, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7997, at *2, 5–6 (Cal. Ct.
App. Sept. 26, 2008).
80. Howell, 989 So. 2d (¶¶ 21–22).
81. People v. Sanchez, No. C057286, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 10334, at *1 (Cal. Ct.
App. Dec. 22, 2008).
82. State v. Williams, 960 A.2d 805, 808 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008).
83. State v. Battle, No. 2007AP1059-CR, 2008 Wisc. App. LEXIS 301, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App.
Apr. 22, 2008).
84. Hudson v. State, No. 14-07-00888-CR, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 499, at *1–2 (Tex. App.
Jan. 29, 2009).
85. State v. Scarborough, No. E-2007-01856-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS
191, at *4–6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 17, 2009).
86. Howell v. State, 989 So. 2d 372 (¶¶ 21–23) (Miss. 2008).
87. Id.
88. Id.
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evidence. As mentioned earlier, we cannot extrapolate from these figures and
determine the mix of procedures followed throughout the country, but the
study does provide insights into the procedures followed in cases where
innocence was claimed based on a misidentification.
Scientific research shows that a witness‘s first viewing of a suspect is
critical because it affects the witness‘s memory of the event. 89 In the case
study reported here, photo arrays, also known as photo lineups or ―6 Packs,‖
were the first procedure followed in obtaining the identifications in fifty-eight
cases (60.4%).90 Show-ups were the first procedure in twenty-two (22.9%) of
the cases. In two of the cases, the witnesses were shown single photos of the
suspects (followed by photo lineups).91 In another three cases, live lineups
were used first. In two cases, the witnesses viewed mug shots at the police
station first.92
In three cases, the witnesses identified the suspects not by recollection of
their facial features, but by things like their ears or their shirts.93 In two cases,
witnesses identified suspects by their tattoos. 94 In other cases, the witnesses
identified the defendants in whole or in part by hearing their voices. 95
Surveillance video was available in several cases, but in only one case did
witnesses first identify the suspect from the video. 96 In another case, the
witness spotted the suspect in public, without police intervention, and this
89. LOFTUS, supra note 25, at 106–08.
90. See infra Table 3.
91. See People v. Noriega, No. B188098, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 10061, at *38 (Cal.
Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2008); State v. Allen, 274 S.W.3d 514, 519 (Mo. App. 2008).
92. See infra Table 3.
93. In one of the photo lineup cases, the witness identified the defendant from a photo lineup
based mostly on his ears. She also had provided a description of the suspect, including height and
race, that varied considerably from the defendant‘s characteristics and she did not mention that the
defendant had a missing tooth. See People v. Rucker, No. 280082, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 2236, at
*1–2 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2008). In yet another photo lineup case, the victim did not see the
defendant‘s face during the assault but identified him based on his build and on his statement that the
victims had ―told on him,‖ which the victims believed referred to an earlier incident involving the
defendant in a grocery store. See People v. Bryant, No. A114925, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS
3154, at *2–6 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2008). In one of the show-up cases, the witness could not see
the culprit‘s face but identified a man police caught in the area by his shirt, build, race, and age. See
People v. Evans, No. H029616, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8541, at *4–5 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 17,
2008).
94. In Scarborough, a rape victim worked with a police sketch artist to develop a composite
sketch of a tattoo, followed by her out-of-court viewing of photos of the suspect‘s tattoos. State v.
Scarborough, No. E-2007-01856-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 191, at *7 (Tenn.
Crim. App. Mar. 17, 2009). In Commonwealth v. Crork, the witness was shown a single photo of the
suspect‘s tattoo. 966 A.2d 585, 587 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009).
95. People v. Nelson, Nos. B195996, B205753, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4472, at *4–5
(Cal. Ct. App. June 2, 2008); State v. Williams, 960 A.2d 805, 809–12 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2008).
96. See Tucker v. State, 965 A.2d 900, 902 (Md. 2009).
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identification was followed by a show-up.97
Table 3. Types of Identification Procedures
Identification Procedure
Photo Lineup
Show-Ups
Identified Physical Attribute Other than Face
(Tattoo, Voice)
Live Lineup
Single Photo
Viewed Mug Shots
No Police Involvement or No Information on
Procedure
In-Court Identification
Viewed Surveillance Video

Number Percentage
58
60.4
22
22.9
3
3.1
3
2
2
2

3.1
2.1
2.1
2.1

1
1

1
1

This group of cases presents a large number of estimator variables that
decrease identification accuracy; the next question is how often police
investigators followed the protocols recommended for reducing
suggestiveness. The study did not include cases in which photo arrays or live
lineups were conducted via the double-blind or sequential method, which is
advanced in the reform proposals. In a few of the cases (6.2%), police
officers read admonitions (usually that the culprit may or may not be in the
show-up or photo array) to witnesses before they viewed a suspect in a showup or photo array. This suggests that in some jurisdictions admonitions have
been introduced as standard procedure. In none of the cases, however, did the
admonition include an assurance that the investigation would continue even if
the witness failed to identify anyone at that time, as suggested in some reform
proposals.98
In a larger number of cases, police officers used practices that can
decrease identification accuracy. For example, in thirteen cases (13.5%)
police officers told witnesses that a suspect had been arrested or taken into
custody, a practice that suggests to a witness that the police have other
evidence to prove the suspect is guilty. 99 A key procedure recommended for
cases involving multiple witnesses is that they should be kept apart during an
identification procedure and should be instructed not to discuss their
identification with other witnesses; 100 however, witnesses were kept together
97. See People v. Romero, 892 N.E.2d 1122, 1125 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
98. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
99. See NAT‘L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 39, at 31–33.
100. See Thompson, supra note 6, at 53.
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during identification procedures in ten (10.4%) cases. 101 In four cases (4.2%),
the police gave confirmatory feedback after the identification was made,
which has been shown to boost a witness‘s confidence level and taint the later
in-court identification process.102
Table 4. Use of Suggestive Procedures
Suggestive Procedure
Number Percentage
Witness Told Suspect in Custody
13
13.5%
Witnesses Viewed Suspect Together
10
10.4%
Police Gave Confirmatory Feedback
4
4.2%
Social science also warns that showing the photo of a suspect in more than
one photo array may cause ―unconscious transference.‖103 There are several
cases in this study in which the police showed a witness the defendant‘s photo
in more than one photo array and the witness was unable to select the
defendant‘s photo, but the witness was nonetheless able to identify the
defendant at a preliminary hearing or at trial.104 In these cases the witnesses
did not identify the defendants on the first try, but were able to do so on a
second attempt. The concern is that a witness may have unconsciously
transferred the image of the defendant‘s face from the photo array and then
erroneously believed that the image was part of the memory of the crime.
Sometimes this unconscious transference can occur through no fault of the

101. In an additional case, one witness told a second witness that she had identified the
defendant in the show-up, despite being told by police not to talk to the other witness. The second
witness then confidently identified the defendant, although she said that the culprit wore a different
outfit. People v. Nelson, Nos. B195996, B205753, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4472, at *5 (Cal.
Ct. App. June 2, 2008).
102. See supra Part II.A. In one of the cases, the witness stated that the confirmatory feedback
made her ―feel better.‖ See Shabazz v. State, 667 S.E.2d 414, 417 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008).
103. See LOFTUS, supra note 25, at 142–44; LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 25, at 106–08.
104. People v. Ybarra, No. F047855, 2008 Cal. App. LEXIS 1421, at *21–22 (Cal. Ct. App.
Sept. 12, 2008) (witness viewed two photo arrays that were identical, with the exception that they
featured two different photographs of the defendant in the same place on the array); People v.
Richardson, No. B197177, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5741, at *4–5 (Cal. Ct. App. July 16,
2008) (witnesses were shown two photo arrays and twice gave equivocal responses, but reported
being 100% sure after seeing the defendant at a preliminary hearing); State v. Zabala, No. 97875,
2008 Kan. App. Unpub. LEXIS 534, at *2–3 (Kan. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2008) (two show-ups of the
defendant given to the same witnesses within minutes of each other, with the second show-up after
the officer discovered in the defendant‘s backpack clothing matching the original description of the
suspect); People v. Hart, No. 272910, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 850, at *1–2 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 29,
2008) (witness viewed surveillance tape and was unable to select the defendant from a photo array,
but identified the defendant at trial after the court the denied defendant‘s request to sit in a spectator
section to force the witness to choose from among a group of spectators); State v. Lee,
No. 2007AP1636-CR, 2008 Wisc. App. LEXIS 546, at *7 (Wis. Ct. App. July 16, 2008) (witness
unable to identify the defendant from a photo lineup, but later identified him at trial).
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police,105 but in other cases police practices can create the potential for the
problem to occur.
IV. JUDICIAL TOLERANCE OF SUGGESTIVE IDENTIFICATION PRACTICES
It is nearly impossible to determine whether there are any wrongful
convictions among the dozens of cases in this study. A few cases raise
serious concerns due to the presence of multiple estimator variables that
reduce accuracy, the use of suggestive police procedures, and the absence of
corroborating evidence. Due to the nature of the encounters in so many of the
cases involving robbery or assaults with firearms, there is generally no
possibility of obtaining DNA evidence from the crime scenes. 106 Thus, these
prosecutions hinge on eyewitness identification of culprits observed under
conditions most likely to lead to misidentification. Are all of the individuals
in the study actually guilty? Juries were willing to find that they were. 107 The
fact that some of these cases could have resulted in convictions ―beyond a
reasonable doubt‖ is highly troubling.
Without strong corroborating
identification evidence, the law should not permit convictions based on
eyewitness identification.108 At a minimum, the law should not continue to
allow the introduction of eyewitness identifications obtained by the police
using procedures that, as indicated by scientific research, create an increased
risk of error in identification.
The study presented here examined appellate court reaction in cases
involving serious challenges to eyewitness identification testimony. The
findings are quite sobering. Of the ninety-six cases studied, only two resulted
in reversals, and in both cases the error was based on something other than the
eyewitness identification evidence. 109 In State v. Washington, for example, a
105. In one case, the defendant claimed that he had been in the store as an innocent bystander
during the armed robbery and that the witnesses erroneously remembered him as the robber instead.
People v. Robinson, No. 276889, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 743, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2008).
If true, this would be a classic form of unconscious transference.
106. See Gross et al., supra note 1, at 530–31.
107. See BRIAN L. CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION : THE
EYEWITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW 207–09 (1995) (summarizing survey studies, prediction
studies, and mock juror studies, and concluding that ―jurors are generally insensitive to factors that
influence eyewitness identification accuracy, often rely on factors (such as recall of peripheral
details) that are not diagnostic of witness accuracy, and rely heavily on one factor, eyewitness
confidence, that possesses only modest value as an indicator of witness accuracy‖).
108. See generally Thompson, supra note 2 (arguing in favor of a corroborating evidence
requirement for admission of eyewitness identification testimony); see also Noah Clements, Flipping
a Coin: A Solution for the Inherent Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 40 IND. L.
REV. 271, 272, 290 (2007) (proposing a blanket exclusion of eyewitness identification testimony in
criminal cases).
109. A third case was remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the identification testimony. See
State v. Chipi, No. A-6156-05T4, 2008 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 304, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
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North Carolina court of appeals reversed a conviction based on an
unnecessary and unreasonable delay of nearly five years and its effects on
witness memory. 110 In one other case, a Michigan appellate court upheld the
exclusion of a pre-trial identification (on Fourth Amendment grounds) but
then affirmed the admission of in-court identifications by the same
witnesses.111 Thus, in only one case was there a total preclusion of
identification testimony, and that was based on a violation of the defendant‘s
speedy trial right.112 In every other case, the eyewitnesses were permitted to
provide eyewitness identification testimony in some form.
A. Claims of Unduly Suggestive Procedures and Unreliability
The United States Supreme Court has fashioned a due process
exclusionary remedy for unduly suggestive identification procedures;
however, even an unduly suggestive identification need not be excluded if it is
determined to be sufficiently reliable. 113 The federal standard for determining
reliability calls on courts to take into account five factors in evaluating the
totality of the circumstances:
[T]he opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the
time of the crime, the witness‘ degree of attention, the
accuracy of the witness‘ prior description of the criminal, the
level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and

Div. Sept. 22, 2008).
110. 665 S.E.2d 799, 812 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008). The defendant‘s primary claim was that the
avoidable delay by the prosecution caused the eyewitnesses‘ memories to fade, creating a serious risk
of misidentification. Id. at 811–12; see also People v. Earle, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 261, 266–67 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2009). In Earle, the trial court refused to sever an indecent exposure case supported by strong
evidence from a sexual assault case in which the eyewitness‘s description of the attacker differed
greatly from the defendant‘s actual appearance. Id. at 266. The victim in each case also gave
different descriptions of her respective assailant‘s vehicle. Id. Additionally, the sexual assualt victim
had managed to break loose from her attacker, but the defendant was a world-class competitor in the
sport of ―submission grappling.‖ Id. For these reasons, the appeals court found that there was
―fertile ground for a reasonable doubt in jurors‘ minds that the victim had correctly identified
defendant as her assailant.‖ Id. The joinder of the less serious indecent exposure case, for which
there was strong evidence, thus ―played a central role, and quite possibly a decisive one, in securing a
conviction on the assault charge.‖ Id. at 267.
111. See People v. Leonard, No. 270638, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 1110, at *1, 41–43 (Mich.
Ct. App. May 27, 2008). The Supreme Court has permitted the admission of in-court identification
testimony, even if the pre-trial identification testimony is excluded, if there is a finding that the incourt identification is based on an independent recollection of the events and is not the product of the
tainted identification procedure. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 241 (1967).
112. Washington, 665 S.E.2d at 812.
113. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 104 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199
(1972); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 385–86 (1968); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293,
294, 299 (1967).
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the confrontation. 114
This five-factor test, fashioned in 1972, has been roundly criticized for
including witness certainty as a factor when social science research shows that
witness confidence in an identification does not necessarily correlate with
accuracy, and that a witness‘s confidence level has a tendency to rise as the
witness moves through the criminal justice process. 115 Nonetheless, state
appellate courts, with few exceptions, continue to apply this test (including
the witness confidence prong) in assessing federal and state due process
claims.116 Courts seem unfamiliar with, or unpersuaded by, the scientific
research on witness confidence, and they erroneously rely on witness certainty
in evaluating the reliability of the identification. 117
In addition, the Supreme Court‘s decisions focus solely on police conduct
in determining whether the identification process was ―unduly suggestive,‖
which is the basis for a due process claim. 118 Thus, cases in which suggestion
is introduced by a private citizen or in which identifications are simply
unreliable due to the presence of multiple estimator variables—through no
fault of the police—do not raise a due process issue. 119
These cases raise a variety of claims relating to eyewitness identification.
In many cases, defendants challenge the identification testimony on due
process grounds, claiming that the procedures used to obtain the identification
were unduly suggestive and that the resulting identification is unreliable. 120
114. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199–200.
115. See Shaw & McClure, supra note 56, at 629–30; see generally Timothy P. O‘Toole &
Giovanna Shay, Manson v. Brathwaite Revisited: Towards a New Rule of Decision for Due Process
Challenges to Eyewitness Identification Procedures, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 109, 120–22 (2006) (calling
for an updated rule in part because witness confidence levels are not necessarily strongly correlated
with accuracy and can be infected by suggestion).
116. See infra notes 136–37 and accompanying text.
117. See, e.g., People v. Gandara, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4780, at *17–18 n.3 (Cal. Ct.
App. June 12, 2008) (identification was reliable in part because the witness ―did not have any doubts
when she picked out Gandara‘s photograph‖ over a year after the crime).
118. The U.S. Supreme Court has only decided cases in which identification procedures were
conducted by the police and has not considered suggestive procedures employed by private parties.
In Manson v. Brathwaite, for example, the Court framed the question as follows: ―[W]hether the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment compels the exclusion, in a state criminal trial, apart
from any consideration of reliability, of pretrial identification evidence obtained by a police
procedure that was both suggestive and unnecessary.‖ 432 U.S. at 99 (emphasis added). But see
State v. Chen, 952 A.2d 1094, 1105–06 (holding that New Jersey evidence rules require that courts
grant ―a preliminary hearing when the reliability of State‘s identification evidence is called into
question by evidence of highly suggestive words or conduct by private actors that pose a significant
risk of misidentification‖).
119. See, e.g., People v. Richards, No. F054916, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9262, at *15–
16 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2008) (noting that no authority exists for the proposition that conduct by
private citizens can be the basis for a motion to exclude identification testimony).
120. See infra notes 122, 127 and accompanying text.
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Sometimes, misidentification claims are incorporated into claims of
ineffectiveness of counsel when purported counsel errors relate to eyewitness
identification evidence. 121
One type of due process claim centers on the makeup of a photographic
lineup or live lineup. Defendants argue that these lineups are unduly
suggestive either because the defendant is the only person in the group who
fits the witness‘s description or because the defendant‘s photo is said to ―stand
out.‖122 Courts generally reject these claims and find that the other persons in
the lineup are sufficiently similar to the defendant in appearance, and, thus,
the lineup is not unduly suggestive. 123 This is the case even if the defendant‘s
photo is the only one with a different color background or is a different size
than the rest,124 because courts focus instead only on the similarity of features
of the individuals in the photos; sometimes even the dissimilarity of the
individuals‘ features is not considered important. In People v. Lloyd, for
example, the court rejected such a claim despite the fact that both witnesses
stated that the people in most of the photos either did not match the
description or were too old to be the culprit. 125 The Lloyd court concluded
that, despite the fact that individuals in up to four of the six photos ―may have
looked too old, thereby eliminating them from consideration by the
eyewitnesses, [that] does not mean that the witnesses were thereby forced to
misidentify [the] defendant.‖126
Several other cases challenged the suggestiveness of show-ups. In
People v. Acosta, the appellate court rejected the defendant‘s challenge to the
use of a show-up. 127 The defendant cited the U.S. Department of Justice
Guide and a California Department of Justice District Attorney‘s Association
Field Guide for the proposition that field show-ups are ―automatically
121. See, e.g., Richards, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9262, at *3–4; State v. Lyons,
No. 90604, 2008-Ohio-5099, ¶ 11 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2008); State v. Taylor, No. 90001, 2008Ohio-3455, ¶ 89 (Ohio Ct. App. July 10, 2008).
122. See, e.g., People v. Rutledge, No. A117967, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5995 (Cal. Ct.
App. July 24, 2008) (defendant was the only person in the lineup with braids); People v. Romero,
892 N.E.2d 1122, 1125 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (defendant was the only person in the photo array with a
teardrop tattoo).
123. See, e.g., People v. Styles, No. F054133, 2009 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 195, at *14 (Cal.
Ct. App. Jan. 12, 2009); People v. Bolden, No. G038374, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 10253, at
*9–20 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2008); Rutledge, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5995, at *11–12;
People v. Richardson, No. B197177, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5741, at *20 (Cal. Ct. App. July
16, 2008); People v. Acosta, No. E042057, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3929, at *13–15 (Cal. Ct.
App. May 14, 2008); Romero, 892 N.E.2d at 1128–30; State v. Blackburn, No. W2007-00061-CCAR3-CD, 2008 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 439, at *13 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 10, 2008).
124. See, e.g., Richardson, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5741, at *19–20.
125. No. 277172, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 2196, at *7–8 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2008).
126. Id. at *8–9.
127. No. E045031, 2009 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 906, at *1, 10 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2009).
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suggestive.‖128 The court relied on precedent in rejecting the contention that a
show-up should be considered automatically suggestive and instead applied
the same five factors of the federal due process test. 129 Interestingly, the court
rejected the contention that the show-up was suggestive despite two facts
indicating otherwise: (1) it was a single-person field show-up; and (2) the
police told the witness that the defendant was the person they had arrested. 130
The court stated that telling the witness that the police had arrested the suspect
―was not particularly suggestive, as most people asked to make an
identification at a show-up would probably assume that a person detained by
police as a suspect is probably under arrest.‖131 This conclusion flies in the
face of social science literature and common sense. It is precisely because
people will assume that the police believe that a person displayed in a oneperson show-up is guilty that the use of show-ups is suggestive. 132 If an
officer confirms a person‘s belief that the police have enough evidence to
arrest the person, the problem of suggestiveness is only exacerbated.
Appellate courts also seem to misunderstand the dangers of confirmatory
feedback, leading them to reject claims on the grounds that the feedback,
given after the identification is made, does not render the selection process
suggestive. 133 Contrary to courts‘ position, scientific studies indicate that the
danger of such feedback is that it can vastly elevate the confidence level that a
witness will later report from the level that the witness actually experienced at
the time of the selection.134 Thus, the problem with confirmatory feedback is
not that it renders the identification process ―suggestive,‖ but that it creates a
tendency to bolster a witness‘s perception of his or her true level of
confidence. Thus, the witness later will overstate his or her certainty in the
identification, when the true level of confidence might have been much lower
without the confirmatory feedback. Of course, there is still the problem that
witness confidence statements, with or without confirmatory feedback, are
notoriously unreliable anyway. 135
Even when defendants cite to reform proposals and ask courts to require
128. Id. at *7.
129. Id. at *6–7. The court cited the California Supreme Court decision that adopted the
federal test. Id. (reiterating the test from People v. Cunningham, 25 P.3d 519 (Cal. 2001)).
130. Acosta, 2009 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 906, at *7–8.
131. Id. at *8.
132. See supra notes 29–33 and accompanying text.
133. See, e.g., People v. Gandara, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4780, at *15–16 (Cal. Ct.
App. June 12, 2008) (confirmatory feedback was given after the witness‘s unaided identification of
the defendant, therefore, the feedback did not taint the pretrial identification nor did it invalidate the
in-court identification); State v. Smith, 946 A.2d 319, 325 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008) (same); State v.
Allen, 274 S.W.3d 514, 525 (Mo. App. 2008) (same).
134. See, e.g., supra note 10 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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the police to follow less suggestive procedures, the courts decline to impose
such requirements on the police as a matter of either evidentiary or
constitutional law.136 Instead, the courts simply follow the five-factor test in
Manson v. Brathwaite,137 including the scientifically invalid witness
confidence prong. 138
B. Claims Challenging Jury Instructions on Eyewitness Identification or
Decisions to Exclude Expert Testimony
Two areas left within the discretion of the trial court are the issuance of
jury instructions and the admission of expert testimony. Appellate courts
usually reject challenges to the exclusion of expert witness testimony on
eyewitness identifications. Sometimes, the claims are rejected on the basis
that there was sufficient corroborating identification evidence. 139 Other times,
the appellate courts find that the decision is a matter within the trial court‘s
discretion, that jury instructions and the argument of counsel suffice to alert
the jury about the issues with eyewitness identification testimony, or that the
jury is sufficiently able to evaluate the testimony without the assistance of an

136. See, e.g., Smith, 946 A.2d at 327 (concluding without explanation that ―[d]ue process does
not require the suppression of a photographic identification that is not the product of a double-blind,
sequential procedure‖); Gibson v. State, 661 S.E.2d 850, 854 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (failure to read
admonition form did not render a lineup procedure impermissibly suggestive); Allen, 274 S.W.3d at
525 (rejecting the claim that police should use blind administration of lineups and make a written
record of a witness‘s responses at the moment of identification because not required by state law);
Taylor v. Commonwealth, 663 S.E.2d 536, 539 (Va. Ct. App. 2008) (rejecting the need for a
sequential, double-blind photo lineup). But see People v. Bryant, No. A114925, 2008 Cal. App.
Unpub. LEXIS 3154, at *13–14 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2008) (defense attorney was not prevented
from asking an expert witness about the DOJ‘s position on double-blind, sequential photo lineups).
137. See, e.g., People v. Richardson, No. B197177, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5741, at
*16–17 (Cal. Ct. App. July 16, 2008); People v. Juarez, No. B197785, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 5273, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. June 30, 2008); Gandara, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4780, at
*14; People v. McGuire, No. F051892, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4108, at *7–8 (Cal. Ct. App.
May 20, 2008); State v. Gwennap, Nos. 98,254, 98,255, 2008 Kan. App. Unpub. LEXIS 622, at *15–
16 (Kan. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2008) (adding an additional factor); State v. Zabala, No. 97875, 2008
Kan. App. Unpub. LEXIS 534, at *11–12 (Kan. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2008); State v. Hall, 43,125, pp. 7–
8 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/4/08), 986 So. 2d 863, 869; People v. Thomas, No. 272731, 2008 Mich. App.
LEXIS 1221 (Mich. Ct. App. June 12, 2008); People v. Robinson, No. 276889, 2008 Mich. App.
LEXIS 743, at *6 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2008); Howell v. State, 989 So. 2d 372 (¶¶ 21–23) (Miss.
2008); State v. Lyons, No. 90604, 2008-Ohio-5099, ¶ 17 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2008); State v.
Taylor, No. 90001, 2008-Ohio-3455, ¶ 94 (Ohio Ct. App. July 10, 2008); State v. Segines,
No. 89915, 2008-Ohio-2041 (Ohio Ct. App. May 1, 2008); State v. Lee, No. 2007AP1636-CR, 2008
Wisc. App. LEXIS 546, at *9 (Wis. Ct. App. July 16, 2008).
138. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
139. See, e.g., People v. Olague, No. C053372, 2009 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2754, at *97
(Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2009); People v. Bolden, No. G038374, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 10253,
at *22 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2008); People v. Lloyd, No. 277172, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 2196, at
*7–8 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2008); People v. Smith, 869 N.Y.S.2d 88, 89 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008).

2009]

JUDICIAL BLINDNESS

663

expert (and presumably without any assistance at all). 140 Indeed, in some
cases the courts even have shown hostility toward the idea of admitting expert
testimony on the science of eyewitness identification. 141
Not only is witness confidence erroneously considered in the due process
reliability test, courts in some jurisdictions compound the error by also
instructing juries to consider it in evaluating the reliability of identification
testimony. Many cases in the study challenge the use of this jury instruction.
In People v. Nelson, for example, a California court of appeals upheld the use
of this standard jury instruction that instructs jurors to consider ―the extent to
which the witness is either certain or uncertain of the identification.‖ 142
Further, a due process challenge to the use of this instruction was rejected in
People v. Ruiz, despite the fact that the court agreed that ―there may be little
correlation between a witness‘s certainty and reliability of the
identification.‖143 Defendants sometimes also seek reversal because trial
courts have refused to give cautionary jury instructions on police suggestion
in the eyewitness identification process. 144

140. See, e.g., People v. Fowlkes, No. B198406, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6971, at *22
(Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2008) (permitting the expert to offer his opinion would have improperly
allowed the judge and jury to shift responsibility for the decision to the witness); State v. Allen, 274
S.W.3d 514, 526 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (exclusion may be based on a theory that jurors can ―‗rely on
their own experience to reach a judgment on what weight to give eyewitness evidence‘‖) (internal
citation omitted).
141. In Bolden, for example, the trial court rejected the admission of expert testimony,
according to the appellate court, on the ground that ―Shomer [the expert witness] ‗seemed like an
advocate‘ and had overstated the importance of certain factors.‖ 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS
10253, at *14–15; People v. Ruiz, No. E044016, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8960, at *18 (Cal.
Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2008) (referring to scientific findings on witness certainty as ―certain experts‘
opinions that have not yet achieved widespread acceptance in California jurisprudence‖).
142. Nos. B195996, B205753, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4472 (Cal. Ct. App. June 2,
2008), at *9–10; see also Gwennap, 2008 Kan. App. Unpub. LEXIS 622, at *16–17 (not error to
instruct on witness certainty as a factor lending reliability to identification); People v. Canfield,
No. A118126, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9289, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2008); People v.
Luna, No. G039202, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9001, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 2008);
Juarez, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5273, at *7; People v. Rodriguez, 387 Ill. App. 3d 812, 820
(Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
143. 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8960, at *16. In Ruiz, the court rejected the due process
challenge to the instruction despite the fact that experts have stated that witness confidence does not
correlate with accuracy. Id. at *15–16. The court concluded that to find a due process violation
―would essentially be binding the jury to accept certain experts‘ opinions that have not yet achieved
widespread acceptance in California jurisprudence.‖ Id. at *18. The court also found no error in the
―alleged ‗contradiction‘ between defendant‘s expert testimony and the trial court‘s jury instruction.‖
Id. at *19.
144. People v. Wells, No. B200441, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7859, at *10–11, 15–16
(Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2008) (affirming the trial court‘s refusal to instruct the jury to consider
whether ―police exercised coercion or deception or suggestion in the identification process‖ and, if
so, ―whether or not it was of such a nature as to be reasonably likely to produce a misidentification‖);
People v. Deo, Nos. C047126, C046880, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4822, at *12–13 (Cal. Ct.
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Even if identification evidence was erroneously admitted or expert
testimony erroneously excluded, the conviction will not be reversed when
there is sufficient corroborating evidence of identification (and, thus, less risk
of misidentification).145 Thus, corroborating evidence of identification plays a
role at the back end of the process, but it is not a requirement for admission of
identification testimony. 146
The Nelson case raises so many troubling issues that it justifies a closer
look. First, it is a prime candidate for scientifically sound jury instructions on
the limited relevance of witness confidence in evaluating identification
reliability. In Nelson, the defendant was convicted of committing two similar
robberies of the same fast-food restaurant.147 There was no corroborating
evidence of identification148 and, other than the eyewitness‘s identification
testimony, other critical facts indeed tended to exonerate the suspect. For
example, the robber had worn a black sweatshirt with a white shirttail hanging
out from underneath, but the defendant was arrested in a nearby park soon
after the robbery wearing a ―blue or purple shirt.‖149 According to the court,
―[o]ne of the deputies testified that criminals commonly wear multiple layers
of clothing during crimes, so that they can avoid detection afterwards by
shedding a layer of clothing.‖150 There are at least three problems with this
theory: (1) the robber had worn the same black sweatshirt in the two robberies
for which Nelson was tried, which is not consistent with the ―shedding a
layer‖ idea; (2) the robber wore the same clothes to the same restaurant on
two occasions, suggesting that this was not a particularly calculating robber;
and (3) the layer of clothing under the black sweatshirt was white, but
App. June 13, 2008) (affirming the trial court‘s refusal to instruct the jury to be cautious in
considering eyewitness identifications).
145. People v. Olague, No. C053372, 2009 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2754, at *97 (Cal. Ct.
App. Apr. 7, 2009); People v. Bolden, No. G038374, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 10253, at *18–
19 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2008).
146. See generally Thompson, supra note 2 (arguing in favor of a corroboration requirement
for admission of eyewitness identification testimony).
147. Nelson, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4472, at *1.
148. The robber‘s face was not clear on surveillance videos of the two robberies, and no
fingerprints were found on the knife found on the ground near an alley. Id. at *5 n.2, 6.
149. Id. at *4. It is not uncommon for suspects not to match witness descriptions. See, e.g.,
People v. Earle, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 261, 266 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (victim characterized the assailant as
looking Mexican and skinny, but the defendant clearly looked northern European and had an athletic
build with a bull neck; the defendant also had a deeply furrowed brow and protruding, possibly
damaged ears, which the victim did not mention); People v. Fowlkes, No. B198406, 2008 Cal. App.
Unpub. LEXIS 6971, at *4–5, 7 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2008) (appellant had a shaved head, but the
shooter had ―hair on his head‖ and the appellant appeared to have lighter skin than he did on the day
of the shooting; victim also described the car as a white two-door Dodge Neon with a green emblem
on the back, but the co-defendant drove a white, four-door Honda Civic with no green sign or
emblem on the back).
150. Nelson, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4472, at *6.
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defendant was found wearing a blue or purple shirt.151 In addition, the police
officers found a small amount of currency on the ground near the knife that
was recovered, but they did not recover the black sweatshirt or the white shirt
worn underneath. 152
Moreover, the police could not account for the other money stolen in the
second robbery, moments before Nelson‘s arrest.153 He was found with only a
small amount of money on him when arrested. 154 A deputy testified that
criminals commonly attempt to avoid detection by disposing of loot after a
robbery.155 However the defendant would not have had time to spend the
money, and it makes little sense to think he would throw the stolen money
away on the off chance that he might be arrested.
In addition, even the identification testimony was not particularly solid.
First, all the identifications were cross-racial, which are scientifically shown
to be less reliable. 156 Scientific findings indicate that such identifications are
less accurate even if the witness harbors no significant biases and has had
frequent interactions with persons of that race. 157 Yet at trial, one witness was
allowed to testify that she had ―friends and coworkers who were AfricanAmerican, and could distinguish between different people of that race.‖ 158
The second witness also testified to a professed ability to distinguish people of
different races.159
The witnesses also did not inspire confidence in their true ability to
recognize the culprit. At trial, the victim of the first robbery, Mr. Hernandez,
said he did not get a good look at the robber‘s face. 160 He could not give a
positive identification of Mr. Nelson, but he was nonetheless allowed to
testify that the defendant looked ―‗familiar‘‖ to him.161 After the second
robbery, Ms. Martinez, who had viewed both robberies, testified that she was
―positive‖ that the defendant was the robber; however, she had shown less
confidence when she identified him just after the second robbery. 162 Ms.
Martinez viewed the defendant in a show-up at which he was illuminated with
bright lights, without handcuffs, and not wearing a black sweatshirt as the

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at *3–6.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id. at *6.
Id.
Id. at *3–6.
See Thompson, supra note 2, at 1501.
Nelson, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4472, at *3.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.

666

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[93:639

robber had worn. 163 She said that she recognized the defendant‘s face
(because his clothes were different) but wanted to be sure, so she asked to
hear his voice.164 Only after he spoke the words, ―Open the register,‖ did she
identify him. 165 Ms. Martinez said she then was ―a hundred percent sure that
it was him.‖166 However, social science research on voice identification
shows that attempts to recognize an unfamiliar voice, based on minimal
interaction under stressful circumstances, are highly unreliable, and yet
witnesses will exhibit high confidence in their abilities to make such
identifications. 167
Ms. Martinez then told the second witness, Ms. Diaz, that she had
identified the defendant, despite being told not to do so by the police. 168 In
this way, she tainted Ms. Diaz‘s identification. Ms. Diaz then stated that she
could identify the defendant by his face even though he was wearing ―‗a
whole different . . . outfit.‘‖169 When this witness viewed Mr. Nelson, he was
wearing handcuffs.170 She also stated that she was positive that he was the
robber, relying on her recollection of his face. 171
Ms. Diaz‘s identification is tainted by several suggestive facts: (1) the
defendant was the only person shown to the witness by the police; (2) the
previous witness told the second witness that she had identified the defendant;
and (3) the defendant was shown to the witness while the defendant was
wearing handcuffs and having bright lights shined on him. 172 Given that the
first witness had already identified Mr. Nelson as the robber, there was no
need for a second show-up. Presumably, the police could have organized a
live lineup for the second witness instead.
Again, it is impossible to know from reading the appellate case law
whether someone like Mr. Nelson is actually guilty or not. The jury found
him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on the sole basis of eyewitness
testimony, which rested in large part on voice identification by the principal
witness.173 Mr. Nelson is serving a fourteen-year prison sentence. 174 His
163. Id. at *4.
164. Id. at *4–5.
165. Id.
166. Id. Another case from the study that relied in part on voice identification is People v.
Bryant, No. A114925, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3154, at *24 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2008).
167. See Lawrence M. Solan & Peter M. Tiersma, Hearing Voices: Speaker Identification in
Court, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 373, 393–413 (2003) (reviewing the social science of voice identification).
168. Nelson, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4472, at *5.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at *6.
172. Id. at *4–6.
173. Id. at *4–5.
174. Id. at *1.

2009]

JUDICIAL BLINDNESS

667

appeal challenged the admission of the eyewitness testimony on several
grounds, including the use of a jury instruction that told jurors to take into
account witness confidence in determining the reliability of the testimony. 175
Ideally, the instruction would instead warn jurors not to give weight to
witness confidence. In reviewing Mr. Nelson‘s challenge to the use of the
jury instruction on witness confidence, the lower appellate court simply
deferred to the California Supreme Court‘s approval of the instruction and
found ―no impropriety‖ in the use of the witness confidence factor listed in
the standard jury instruction. 176
V. CONCLUSION
The innocence movement, armed with DNA evidence, has led to the
release of hundreds of people who had been wrongly convicted.177 Influential
groups have reacted by devoting a great deal of study to arrive at scientifically
supported recommendations for preventing future miscarriages of justice. 178
Having marked the ten-year anniversary of the DOJ‘s Guidelines for
Eyewitness Identifications, it behooves us to evaluate the implementation
stage of the innocence reform movement. Unfortunately, the improved
procedures have not been widely mandated through the political process. 179 A
paltry number of jurisdictions have adopted the recommended procedures—
only two states and a handful of local law enforcement agencies have adopted
the key procedures recommended for eyewitness identifications, such as
sequential, double-blind administration of lineups and photo arrays.180 Can
we rely on the police departments themselves to adopt the changes? In this
country, there are almost 19,000 independent police departments, 181 and there
are no widely followed professional accreditation standards that might impose
the recommended procedures as a condition for accreditation.182 The failure
of the political process to mandate such changes has left virtually all law
enforcement agencies in forty-seven states free to ignore the scientific
175. Id. at *1–2, 9–10.
176. Id. at *11.
177. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
179. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 39–51 and accompanying text.
181. See International Association of Chiefs of Police, About IACP, http://www.theiacp.org/
About/tabid/57/Default.aspx (touting a worldwide membership of 20,000 police chiefs representing
agencies of all sizes) (last visited Apr. 20, 2010); International Association of Chiefs of Police,
Foundation:
Global
Enrichment
Program,
http://www.theiacp.org/Foundation/Programs/
GlobalEnrichementProgram/tabid/534/Default.aspx (counting 1,600 international members in ninetysix countries) (last visited Apr. 20, 2010).
182. See Thompson, supra note 2, at 1520 (stating that ―only a fraction of police departments
have applied for national accreditation status,‖ so it is not considered an effective way to regulate
police practices).
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findings and recommendations for change, and that would appear to be
precisely what they have done. The same, faulty eyewitness identification
practices of the past that produced hundreds of erroneous convictions continue
to be used today.
The study presented in this Article has shown that in a large number of
robbery, murder, and assault cases there continue to be grave concerns about
eyewitness misidentification of innocent defendants. Unfortunately, DNA
evidence is not available in most robbery or murder cases, so any innocent
persons who are wrongly identified are not likely to be exonerated in the
fashion of those wrongly convicted of sexual assaults in the past. Is there any
reason to believe that eyewitness-victims in sexual assault cases are more
prone to err in identification than eyewitness-victims in robbery or homicide
cases? In a word: No. There is no reason to think robbery victims make for
better eyewitnesses than sexual assault victims. 183 Indeed, misidentifications
in robberies most likely occur at a greater rate than in rapes because
―robberies are frequently quick, and may involve less immediate physical
contact,‖184 making an accurate identification less likely. Thus, the number of
wrongly convicted persons undoubtedly is many times greater than the
number of exonerated individuals. 185
We may never have the means to detect the scores of innocent people who
have been wrongly arrested for robberies, murders, and other violent crimes
due to erroneous eyewitness identification. However, at a minimum, courts
can refuse to apply scientifically unsound due process tests and jury
instructions, and they can admit expert testimony to educate the jurors of the
pitfalls of the identification process. Courts can also cite the failure to follow
state-of-the-art practices and note the estimator variables at play in a
particular case (like use of a weapon or disguise) as part of the ―totality of the
circumstances‖ in deciding state due process claims. 186 Instead, the study
reported here shows a disappointing failure of state appellate courts to show
leadership in ensuring greater accuracy in the criminal justice system.

183. See Gross et al., supra note 1, at 530.
184. Id.
185. See Thompson, supra note 2, at 1493 (noting that in 2004 there were over four times as
many robberies committed as there were rapes, 401,470 to 95,089); Gross et al., supra note 1, at 531
(rape exonerations are the ―tip of the iceberg‖ and do not include a much larger group of undetected
false convictions for robberies and other serious crimes of violence for which DNA is unavailable).
186. See Thompson, supra note 6, at 42–59; Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 104 (1977).

